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Marek D. Steedman* 
ROBERT MICKEY, PATHS OUT OF DIXIE: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF 
AUTHORITARIAN ENCLAVES IN AMERICA’S DEEP SOUTH, 1944-1972, 
(PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015). PP. 584. HARDCOVER $80.00. 
PAPERBACK $35.00. 
ANNE M. KORNHAUSER, DEBATING THE AMERICAN STATE: LIBERAL 
ANXIETIES AND THE NEW LEVIATHAN, 1930-1970, (UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA PRESS 2015). PP. 336. HARDCOVER $59.95. 
How vulnerable are liberal democracies to authoritarian takeover? How thin is 
the line between an administrative state weakly constrained by legal and political in-
stitutions and norms, and an “electoral authoritarian” regime draped in the clothing 
of legal forms, popular ideology, and artfully stage-managed electoral theater? What 
might push a liberal democracy across that line, or, alternatively, compel authoritarian 
regimes, whether national or subnational, towards democratization? Both books un-
der review prompt careful, empirically and theoretically nuanced engagement with 
these timely questions. The accounts on offer here detail multiple paths, rather than 
single “roads,” to democratization, paths that are less surely plotted towards robustly 
democratic outcomes than we might like to think. In doing so, they highlight for 
scholars of American political development the virtues of well-constructed compar-
ative case studies, and in general illuminate the distinctive character of the American 
federal state by encouraging new points of contrast and new frames of comparison. 
Robert Mickey’s Paths Out of Dixie is an ambitious and ultimately impressively 
convincing study of “the processes of democratization undergone by Deep South 
states” between 1944 and 1972, one that yields a vast array of new insights into South-
ern political development and challenges mechanistic modernization theories of such 
development. Somewhat surprisingly, as Mickey points out, Southern regime change, 
as such, “has never been examined.”1 An enormous literature exists on Southern eco-
nomic development and political history, of course, and much attention has been 
given to explaining the emergence and rise of the Republican Party in the South. 
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Mickey casts the whole process of twentieth-century Southern political development 
in sharper relief, however, by posing it as a transition from a set of authoritarian 
enclaves nestled within a larger federal democracy, to procedurally democratic re-
gimes analogous both to the American national government as a whole and individual 
states in other regions of the country. The frame allows Mickey to suggest a range of 
comparative projects that might yield greater insight into the processes of Southern 
political development than the, by now rather shopworn, standard comparisons to 
Prussia and South Africa, and provides the basis for a robust challenge to the char-
acterization of the South as composed of “herrenvolk democracies.” Perhaps the Jim 
Crow South might be more usefully compared to “electoral authoritarian” regimes in 
PRI-dominated Mexico, or modern Iran. Or, perhaps democratization in the South 
is most productively compared to that of other subnational “enclaves” in Brazil or 
Argentina, where subnational democratization lags processes at the national level. 
More central to Mickey’s own project is a narrower set of comparisons among 
states in the Deep South themselves. Here Mickey identifies “distinct modes of de-
mocratization” associated with his three central cases, South Carolina, Mississippi, 
and Georgia.2 Briefly stated, the argument is that these distinct modes are best ex-
plained as the result of actions undertaken by differently situated and institutionally 
constrained elite political agents in each state. Mickey distinguishes three key dimen-
sions of democratization in the South: the degree to which state regimes complied 
with administrative and judicial mandates to democratize; the extent to which previ-
ously excluded voters—principally, but not exclusively, black and poor white South-
erners—were incorporated into state politics; and the ease and speed with which state 
level Democratic Parties were reconciled to and reincorporated within the national 
party. Distinct modes constitute different mixes of outcomes along each of these 
dimensions. Early, if superficial, acquiescence to federal democratization pressures 
by South Carolina helped that state manage the incorporation of black voters into the 
electorate and state party with relatively little disruption, producing an early reconcil-
iation with the national party and what Mickey terms “harnessed” democratization. 
Massive, and frequently violent, resistance in Mississippi, by contrast, delayed all of 
these processes and made black incorporation and national reconciliation much more 
difficult to achieve, a result Mickey terms “protracted” democratization. Georgia 
emerges as a middle case, with a northern region, centered on ever-busy Atlanta, 
pursuing a ‘South Carolina way,’ and southern Georgia stubbornly following Missis-
sippi. 
Mickey focuses on elite agency, coupled with the institutional and factional con-
straints within which various political elites operated, to explain this variation in out-
come. In pursuing this explanation, Mickey sets aside more standard modernization 
theories, focused on rates of urbanization and educational attainment, for example, 
or theories premised on the “labor-repressive” regime distinctive to the region—
most associated with agriculture, but often also present in the various resource-ex-
traction and processing industries associated with industrialization in the South. 
Mickey also downplays black political and social mobilization as a factor in explaining 
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variation in democratization across his cases. The point is not that any of these factors 
can be dismissed in a comprehensive account of Southern political development in 
the twentieth century. Rather, Mickey suggests, variation in these factors, while per-
haps accounting for differences between the Outer South and Deep South, cannot, 
even where carefully specified, account for—or lead us to expect—the range of po-
litical outcomes within the Deep South itself. 
The book as a whole weaves together a series of richly detailed and closely ar-
gued narratives to fill out and support the picture I have schematized here. It is im-
possible, even in an extended review, to do justice to the case studies on offer. I will 
instead highlight two issues I think shed light on the broader domain of democrati-
zation and authoritarianism engaged by these books: his attention to public higher 
education desegregation as a fulcrum of regime change, and his critique of the con-
cept “herrenvolk democracy” as generally applied to the South. Each relates to 
Mickey’s conception of democracy, one that frames his insistence on defining pre-
transition Southern states as authoritarian and his specification of what constitutes 
democratization itself. 
For the purpose of this study, Mickey adopts a “proceduralist” account of de-
mocracy drawn from the literature on comparative politics: “democracies must fea-
ture free and fair elections, the safeguarding of rights necessary to sustain such elec-
tions . . . and a state apparatus sufficiently responsive to election winners and 
autonomous from social and economic forces that these elections are meaningful.”3 
From this definition, it is perhaps surprising to find that in each case the state’s han-
dling of its initial crisis over public higher education desegregation acts as a kind of 
switch point, diverting the state onto a specific path out of Dixie. However, as Mickey 
explains, “Jim Crow’s cornerstone was public education.”4 Education was a core 
competence of state and local government across the United States, representing a 
significant portion of their budgets and administrative capacity. In the South specifi-
cally, furthermore, segregated education was deeply entangled both in the reproduc-
tion of white supremacy in economic and social terms, and in policing the racial anx-
ieties animating Jim Crow as a whole. An attack on segregated public education, 
therefore, “challenged rulers—and especially governors—directly in their capacity as 
policymakers, not merely as party leaders.”5 The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, 
when it came, comprised “both a political and a cultural threat to white supremacy 
and a complete disruption of financial and administrative arrangements” in the 
Southern states.6 
Rather than merely symbolic, then, battles over segregated universities lay at the 
heart of regime transition. In part, this was a result of consolidation over higher ed-
ucation policy by Southern states: conflicts over desegregation would inevitably and 
publicly embroil state legislatures and governors. But Mickey also understands the 
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public education system as part of the state apparatus that does, or does not, safe-
guard those rights necessary to the functioning of “free and fair elections”: freedoms 
of association, expression, and speech. Segregation of universities, as well as pressure 
on political expression by university professors and students, functioned as part of a 
larger effort to constrain civil society, providing one of many “internal supports” of 
regime control.7 The picture of democracy on offer, then, is proceduralist, but not 
narrowly constrained to electoral institutions themselves. Desegregation battles over 
universities could shake “southern enclaves to their core” because electoral authori-
tarian regimes, like liberal democracies, require broad systems of internal and external 
support, systems that intersect with almost every area of public life.8 
Even if central, why would these moments of conflict over higher education 
shape later political dynamics? Here my “switch point” metaphor is a little too auto-
matic for what Mickey intends to convey, suggesting something fixed and necessary 
rather than contingent. The general dynamics can be illustrated through Mickey’s 
portrait of Mississippi. That state is almost uniquely identified in the public mind with 
maximalist racist intransigence and violence, but Mickey emphasizes Mississippi’s rel-
atively “moderate” leadership in the immediate post-Brown era, as well as the relatively 
good pre-transition relations obtaining between the state party and its national coun-
terpart.9 The violently protracted transition from authoritarianism in Mississippi was 
not, Mickey argues, a foregone conclusion. Indeed political leaders and business mod-
erates in the state, like those elsewhere in the South, sought to accommodate to, ra-
ther than openly resist, the new federal push towards democracy. The turning point, 
as Mickey relates the story, was the “Battle of Oxford,” a set piece that both revealed 
the state’s deficit in coercive capacity and accelerated white and black insurgencies. 
Here we get a clearer picture of the kinds of institutional constraints that matter 
for Mickey’s story. Key to the violent “debacle” that engulfed the University of Mis-
sissippi campus in the wake of James Meredith’s attempt to desegregate the university 
in 1962 was the severe lack of centralized coercive capacity available to Governor 
Barnett—leaving aside his own quixotic approach to the crisis. When push came to 
shove, the state of Mississippi lacked the capacity to control the crowds of white 
supremacists streaming in from across and beyond the boundaries of the state, failed 
to prevent a full-scale riot on the college campus and, consequently, suffered the 
“humiliation” of seeing order restored by federal and federalized National Guard 
troops. This lack of capacity, in turn, stemmed from two features of Mississippi state 
governance that distinguished it from its sister Deep South enclaves: its relatively high 
degree of factionalism, and its decentralized political structure. The former meant 
“moderates” could not maintain assured control over state responses to desegrega-
tion challenges, and indeed lost control of administration policy with the rise of Ross 
Barnett. The latter—decentralization—compounded the problem, providing consti-
tutional and political roadblocks to the creation of a state police force under the di-
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rection of the governor’s office. When the crisis came, Barnett’s positioning simulta-
neously heightened conflict with the federal government, raised the stakes of any 
subsequent climb down, and prevented maintenance of order on the campus itself. 
Militant white supremacists reacted in fury at the sight of federally imposed desegre-
gation; white supremacist mobilization, in turn, spurred organization by black insur-
gents in and out of Mississippi itself. 
The aftermath of the “Battle of Oxford,” in other words, hardened lines in all 
directions, while underlining the state’s inability to maintain order and prevent vio-
lence. The state lacked the capacity to co-opt white supremacists or prevent repeated 
federal interventions, and heightened racial tensions made attempts at compromise 
or accommodation almost impossible. Reputations forged in the heat of this initial 
battle, meanwhile, shaped subsequent interactions among the principle actors, frac-
turing the state Democratic Party and making both black incorporation into the state 
party and ultimate reconciliation with the national party divisive and long, drawn-out 
affairs. Here the final, and somewhat underplayed, piece of Mickey’s analytical puzzle 
falls into place: the manner in which each state resolved, or failed to resolve, this 
initial challenge to higher education segregation matters for subsequent develop-
ments. Not because these moments represent some initial conditions from which all 
else flows, but because they produce reputational effects—for states and parties, as 
well as individual actors—that resonate through each subsequent development. Rep-
utations, Mickey suggests, both constrain and shape one’s room for political maneu-
ver. Thus, the official state Democratic Party in Mississippi’s reputation as a staunch 
defender of white supremacy and conservatism denied political space to Republican 
Party activists seeking a foothold in the state, while South Carolina’s early and less 
contentious incorporation of black voters and activists constrained Democrats’ abil-
ity to “craft racially conservative electoral appeals.”10 Taken as a whole, then, Mickey 
provides an account of regime change in these states that explains variation in the 
direction of travel towards democracy, while preserving the contingency of each step 
taken along the way. Put differently, legacies work in the present as a result of causal 
forces operating in the present—reputational effects—rather than by the operation 
of lagged causal forces from some point in the past. 
Much depends, of course, on whether one is willing to grant Mickey’s starting 
place: that Southern states in the Jim Crow period are best understood as authoritar-
ian enclaves and not, as the familiar phrase has it, “herrenvolk democracies.” This 
understanding of racially structured polities, first applied to apartheid South Africa 
and quickly transferred to the U.S. South, principally by George Fredrickson, has 
become almost cliché, and Mickey is right to challenge its coherence.11 Herrenvolk 
democracies, the story goes, make “whiteness” a ticket to full citizenship, providing 
robust participation rights and equal status within the regime to whites, while provid-
ing a subordinate status to non-whites. Lower class whites trade economic status for 
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the “psychological wage”12 of identification and solidarity with the master race. In 
fact even its early proponents expressed some reservations about using the term ‘de-
mocracy’ here: Kenneth Vickery described it as a “myth” when applied to the South;13 
Pierre Van den Berghe saw South Africa as a “quasi democracy” with a “democratic 
façade,” particularly after the rise of the National Party in 1948.14 Mickey’s account 
of democracy is intended to cut through this clutter: a regime counts as democratic 
when it provides the conditions for free and fair elections to all citizens, and not 
otherwise. The approach offers more than mere clarity. It highlights the ‘coup’ that 
was often required for Democratic Party activists to secure disenfranchisement pro-
visions in the various Southern states at the turn of the twentieth century—and its 
partisan aim of breaking an emerging Populist-Republican alliance; the highly re-
stricted Jim Crow electorate from which many poorer whites were effectively ex-
cluded; and the relative lack of violent popular resistance to regime change when it 
finally came.15 Mickey is persuasive in showing just how little of the preconditions 
for democracy obtained in the Jim Crow states, even for professional whites, let alone 
lower class ones. He also effectively challenges the evidence for “inter-class solidar-
ity” between elite and lower class that attachment to white supremacy is presumed to 
have forged.16 
Nonetheless, I am hesitant to abandon the phrase ‘herrenvolk’ altogether. Per-
haps it would be better to refer to ‘herrenvolk regimes’ than imply a democratic reality 
that is rarely, if ever, obtained. It is also worth thinking through the implications of 
the fact that white supremacist regimes could not simply rely on majoritarian support 
from whites, even in the Deep South, even at the height of Jim Crow. But these 
authoritarian regimes were distinctively designed to create and maintain racial hierar-
chy and reproduce racial subordination. Their founders had partisan motives, sought 
to establish public order, created an authoritarian regime behind the trappings of 
electoral politics, aimed to maintain the economic hegemony of planter and industri-
alist labor lords alike, and so on. But they also intentionally sought—and achieved—
a white supremacist social, economic, and political order, and it is not intuitively ob-
vious why this latter aim should be taken as a subordinate, or instrumental, to the 
former ones. Social statuses are entangled with economic and political ones in ways 
that make it hard to sort out which takes priority for a given elite, but they are never 
wholly reducible to ideology. Challenges to social statuses, arguably, are at least as 
likely to provoke reactionary responses as challenges to political ones. The virtue in 
Mickey’s approach, however, is to force us to think more carefully about the work 
racial ideology performed in relation to Jim Crow. Rather than inter-class solidarity, 
for example, perhaps white supremacist ideology did more to forge inter-fraction 
                                                          
 12. See generally W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE 
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 13. Kenneth P. Vickery, ‘Herrenvolk’ Democracy and Egalitarianism in South Africa and the U.S. South, 16 Yale L.J. 309, 
310 (1974).  
 14. PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON 82 (1981). 
 15. MICKEY, supra note 1, at 347. 
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solidarity between planters and industrialists, underpinning the “capitalist and reac-
tionary” route to modernization taken by the Southern states as a whole.17 
However that may be, these considerations do not really challenge Mickey’s 
basic logic and claims: whatever role we assign to the racial character of these author-
itarian enclaves this surely did not vary in significant ways across these states, and 
cannot provide an alternative explanation for the variation whose explanation lies at 
the heart of this carefully constructed study. 
If one of the ‘procedural’ conditions for democracy is “a state apparatus suffi-
ciently responsive to election winners and autonomous from social and economic 
forces [such] that . . . elections are meaningful,” how can these conditions themselves 
be maintained when faced with the rise of the administrative state?18 This question 
lies at the heart of historian Anne M. Kornhauser’s carefully delineated study, Debating 
the American State, which aims to reveal an unheralded alternative to New Deal enthu-
siasts and their Cold War critics.19 The point is not to ask how ‘procedural’ democra-
cies can be made more ‘substantively’ so: I am not certain there is a meaningful dis-
tinction here, despite its ubiquity. Rather, it is the procedural conditions themselves, 
and the threat posed to them by the basic operations of administrative government, 
that attracts Kornhauser’s attention, and the attention of the loosely affiliated group 
of intellectuals she dubs “critical liberals.” These intellectuals, Kornhauser shows, 
registered a consistent set of concerns in response to the administrative state as it 
emerged in the 1930s: that it replaced democratic deliberation with rule by techno-
cratic experts, the rule of law with ad-hoc administrative rule making, and legislative 
authority with executive power. Her “critical liberals” are a variegated bunch. What 
they share, however, is not only “unease” and anxiety about the increasing role of the 
administrative state, but also a general identification with the goals for which that 
state was being assembled.20 The result, Kornhauser suggests, is a “sympathetic cri-
tique of statist liberalism,” one concerned more with restraining the emerging levia-
than than destroying it.21 
Kornhauser is aware that beginning her narrative in the 1930s is, in a certain 
sense, unfashionable. APD scholars have expanded their search for the sources of 
American state capacity back into the late nineteenth century, and down from the 
national level to that of states and localities. Nevertheless, the administrative state in 
the United States does undergo a kind of phase shift in the 1930s, in both scale and 
scope, one that justifies Kornhauser’s—and her critical liberals’—attention. Resituat-
ing critical responses to the administrative state to the 1930s and 1940s, meanwhile, 
shifts our focus away from the Soviet Union, which preoccupied less sympathetic 
critics of the New Deal state in later decades. Many of Kornhauser’s critics had direct 
experience of the early phases of Nazi totalitarianism, as well as of the occupation 
                                                          
 17. BARRINGTON MOORE JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN 
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and Nuremberg trials that followed German surrender. These experiences, in turn, 
would shape their understanding of both the perils and possibility inherent in bureau-
cratic government. 
The opening chapters expand on the institutional developments that posed the 
greatest concern to critical liberals. The New Deal state introduced “three distinct 
but overlapping tensions” into the architecture of the American polity.22 The emer-
gency conditions prompting the growth of administrative capacity—and threatening 
the very survival of liberal democracy itself—compelled the creation of efficient, hi-
erarchically organized, bureaucracies, staffed and run by technocratic experts capable 
of both making and implementing decisions in response to contingent, and often 
unprecedented, crises. Technocratic ad hoc rules, issued without oversight, by une-
lected bureaucrats; each of these characteristics of administrative rule flew in the face 
of standard accounts of democratic self-governance. In particular, critical liberals 
worried, they short-circuited individual autonomy, skirted the rule of law, and side-
stepped any majoritarian moment of consent. 
Of course champions of the administrative state offered a partial defense of 
these developments, and while Kornhauser often chides this “administrative ideol-
ogy” for incoherence and inadequacy, she does find, “[a]t times,” it roughly “cohered 
into a technocratic vision of a pragmatic, efficient state.”23 This vision turned on three 
core contentions: that administration was a science, better left in the hands of experts 
than the untutored masses; that legal and political constraints on the administration 
merely prevented these experts from efficiently providing for the public good; and 
that the administration itself was best modeled on industrial and military organiza-
tion, with the President positioned as “the administrator-in-chief.”24 The problem 
with the vision, despite strong ideological support from the emerging field of public 
administration, was that it at times conflicted with equally central tenets of the Amer-
ican political system: the rule of law, constitutional checks on and balances to insti-
tutional power, and the sovereignty of the people. At its worst, administrative ideol-
ogy appeared a mere counsel for “‘coordination for coordination’s sake,’” 
substituting instrumental rationality for the democratic and ethical norms with which 
the critical liberals sought to restrain the state.25 
Each of the chapters that follow take up, and deepen, some aspect of the dem-
ocratic tensions generated by the administrative state, as well as attempts by critical 
liberals to resolve them. As Kornhauser develops her account, she engagingly recov-
ers some now slightly marginal figures, repositions others in illuminating ways, and 
provides enough connecting tissue to persuade that there is at least a family of over-
lapping democratic concepts and aspirations here, if not exactly a school of thought. 
Problems of administrative accountability take center stage first. More precisely, 
the problem of “administrative absolutism” generated concerns among some liberals 
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that the operations of bureaucratic government had been worked free of any legal or 
political oversight, and were too prone to what we would now call ‘bureaucratic cap-
ture’ by powerful interests to be either broadly representative, or grounded in the 
consent, of the people as a whole.26 The broad set of issues raised by law professors 
like Louis Jaffe and Roscoe Pound, or political scientists like E. Pendleton Herring, 
will be familiar. The solutions varied widely. Some sought to increase participation in 
the mechanisms of bureaucratic agencies by underrepresented, or less powerful, 
groups; others sought only to compel technocratic experts to attend to the views and 
needs of these groups when constructing policy. Some hoped that local boards and 
advisory bodies might be broadly representative of the people affected by agency 
regulations; others aimed only to bring the actions of bureaucrats under more sus-
tained judicial, or legislative, review—Kornhauser reads the 1946 Administrative Pro-
cedure Act as an essentially well intentioned attempt at the latter. Critical liberals 
proved more adept at revealing the gulf between bureaucracy and democracy than 
creating the “representative bureaucracy” they presented as an alternative, however.27 
In part, this stemmed from a lack of consensus on the role ordinary citizens might 
play in formulating regulatory policy. In part, it simply reflected the difficulties inher-
ent in reconciling popular participation with hierarchical control. 
These tensions were only exacerbated by the start of World War II, a develop-
ment that both heightened the need for emergency action on the part of the state and 
reduced the intellectual space for considered criticism of American democracy. A 
small group of German refugees—among them Hannah Arendt, Karl Loewenstein, 
and Franz L. Neumann—nonetheless continued to raise questions about the relation 
between administrative fiat and the requirements of democratic governance. For this 
group of thinkers—Kornhauser adopts the label “liberal legalists” here—the ques-
tion was posed in terms of the internal relation between democracy and the rule of 
law.28 Not persuaded by legal positivism—for which law was a mere effect of sover-
eignty—nor tempted by natural or common law traditions—by which their more 
conservative counterparts sought to separate legal substance from form—liberal le-
galists hoped to reveal an ethical dimension embedded in the formal requirements of 
law itself. “That ethical dimension,” as Kornhauser puts the point, “centered on the 
generality, rationality, and fairness of formal law, which, in the view of most of the 
[liberal] legalists, guaranteed a measure of individual freedom—personal and politi-
cal—and equality.”29 Guarantee the conditions of the rule of law, these legalists 
thought, and you provided the institutional basis for the constraint of political power 
and the defense of individual autonomy. 
Two concrete situations put pressure on this conception. First, the Nazi regime 
in Germany had arisen within the legal framework of the Weimar republic, a republic 
supposedly constrained by the liberal constitutional principles liberal legalists hoped 
to defend. Indeed, the legal framework of the republic was never wholly dismantled 
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by the Nazis and continued to cloak even this totalitarian regime in the outward trap-
pings of law. If formal law failed to prevent, and perhaps even operated alongside, 
the Nazi regime, what remained of the supposed internal relation between the rule of 
law and democratic self-governance? Liberal legalists like Loewenstein and Neumann 
answered by insisting that the Nazis’ rise to power had been enabled by the Weimar 
constitution’s too “capacious emergency clause”—the infamous Article 48—rather 
than features of constitutional law, itself.30 Further, they argued, Nazi Germany had 
not been a legal regime, or, as some argued, a ‘‘dual” regime with national authoritar-
ianism underpinned by subnational legal institutions and norms—the debate has 
more than a passing resemblance to Mickey’s concerns about the cogency of the 
phrase “herrenvolk democracy.”31 Nonetheless, Nazism had emerged from a liberal 
democracy, and liberal legalists needed an account of why. In a particularly compel-
ling contrast with Friedrich von Hayek—with whom liberal legalists shared some 
ground—Kornhauser explains that, for these liberals, the structure of monopoly cap-
italism itself, and the administrative state required to regulate and manage it, created 
the conditions for the arbitrary and unconstrained use of power that threatened au-
thoritarianism. The argument was sobering, entailing as it did that the United States 
might be as vulnerable to authoritarian collapse as Weimar Germany itself. 
The second challenge to the liberal legalist rule of law ideal, the American oc-
cupation of Germany and conduct of the Nuremberg trials, only served to underline 
the implications of these arguments. Two problems impressed themselves with par-
ticular insistence. How could a constitutional democracy be founded by military 
force? And by what application of law could Nazi war criminals be tried, when most 
of their actions had been taken under command or could not be recognized as crimes 
under the terms of international or national law obtaining at the time they were com-
mitted? Kornhauser is clear that the liberal legalists failed to come up with particularly 
convincing answers here. Indeed, she expresses concern that the arguments they did 
develop—including Carl Friedrich’s defense of constitutional dictatorship—could 
later be applied by Cold Warriors to the rapidly developing national security state 
being built to oppose communism at home and abroad. For Kornhauser, the im-
portance of these thinkers lies in their attempts to grapple, however unsuccessfully, 
with the need to ensure individual rights, legal procedures, and fair representation 
even under emergency conditions. 
It would be fair to say that none of the thinkers canvassed so far fully realized 
their attempt to “theorize a third way” between untrammeled market capitalism, on 
the one hand, and an unconstrained leviathan, on the other.32 That task would fall to 
John Rawls, who Kornhauser helpfully relates to this tradition of “sympathetic” crit-
ics of the administrative state.33 Kornhauser covers more ground here than I can 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 101. 
 31. Id. at 119. 
 32. Id. at 114. 
 33. KORNHAUSER, supra note 19, at 75. 
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briefly indicate, but of particular note is her emphasis on Rawls’s critique of utilitari-
anism as “a rough stand-in for a critique of the administrative state,” highlighting the 
focus on instrumental rationality, efficiency, and cost-benefit analysis that underlies 
both.34 Kornhauser is adept at sorting out the differences among the various forms 
of social choice theory and utilitarianism available to Rawls as he was formulating his 
ideas, as well as attending to the uses Rawls made of them. The upshot is a Rawls 
who insisted that the maintenance of a just society—if not the generation of its ani-
mating principles—required citizens with “an affective moral disposition” capable of 
understanding the principles of justice and regulating their society in light of them, as 
well as “social institutions—families, schools, and so on” within which this moral 
disposition would be formed. These Rawlsian citizens could not be as ‘unencum-
bered’ as some of his critics have avowed. 
How “sympathetic” were these critics, finally? Rawls, at least, rejected “welfare 
state capitalism”—and “laissez-faire capitalism”—as incompatible with the principles 
of justice.35 At least some of Kornhauser’s critical liberals, as we have seen, identified 
“monopoly capitalism” as a potential source of fascism. It could be argued that the 
defense of welfare state capitalism defines “statist liberalism” itself, in which case the 
critical liberals might appear more radical than Kornhauser takes them to be.36 Still, 
even were this so, Kornhauser’s main contention is that other liberalisms were pos-
sible, even as the New Deal state was being constructed. Here she succeeds admira-
bly, even if it is hard, at times, to identify just what alternative arrangement would 
follow. Liberalism was quite capable of producing an internal critique of the emerging 
liberal state without lapsing into libertarianism or nostalgia for the lost certainties of 
a pre-industrial age. Identifying and elaborating that alternative enriches our under-
standing of the liberal tradition itself, suggesting a pliability and critical purchase in-
ternal to liberalism that a one-dimensional view might miss. 
“Can you draw out Leviathan with a fishhook? . . . Will he plead with you at 
length? Will he speak soft words to you? Will he make an agreement with you to be 
taken as your lifelong slave?”37 Carl Schmitt thought not, famously. Emergency con-
ditions always overwhelm normal politics; liberal, ethical, and democratic norms are 
unworkable at best, disingenuous and deceptive at worst. In any case, democracy is 
defined not by its procedures but by the identity of ruler and ruled—a definition 
potentially capable of rescuing “herrenvolk democracy” from the theoretical dustbin. 
It is at least to some degree the apparent—if perhaps spurious—coherence of this 
view that provokes liberal anxiety in the face of the administrative state. John Rawls’s 
public philosophy is among the few attempts to meet this challenge from first prin-
ciples, so to speak. If it does not, as Kornhauser implies, finally convince, we find 
ourselves relatively unarmed as we confront both a resurgent faith in technocratic 
expertise and administrative rule and increasingly hostile attempts to seize control of 
the state for reactionary purposes. No answer to this problem can be advanced here, 
                                                          
 34. Id. at 181. 
 35. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 137 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
 36. KORNHAUSER, supra note 19, at 49. 
 37. Job 40:25-28. 
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nor is it clearly the province of political historians and students of American political 
development to do so. Both Mickey and Kornhauser’s excellent, detailed, and 
thought-provoking interventions, however, remind us that democratic façades are 
easier to construct and maintain than the institutions and norms that make for dem-
ocratic realities. They each similarly suggest that the cultural and institutional means 
to authoritarian rule lie ready to hand in the United States as elsewhere in the indus-
trial world. As we seek the sources of administrative capacity, and shifts in governing 
authority within administrative regimes, we would be wise to attend to the mecha-
nisms that preserve and undermine procedural democracy itself. 
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